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Text File | 1994-05-02 | 35KB | 660 lines

<text> <title> Russia in Search of Itself </title> <article> <hdr> National Interest, June 1992 Russia in Search of Itself </hdr> <body> By Sergei Stankevich--state counsellor of the Russian Federation for Policy Issues. We must discuss the foreign policy of Russia at a time when the country has yet to recognize itself as a state and to shape the attributes of statehood--an army for instance. It does not have borders fixed in accordance with the practice of international law, does not have a sensible and formulated system of national interests on which foreign policy might be built, and has not recognized its particular historical mission. With us, foreign policy does not emanate from the precepts and priorities of evolved statehood. On the contrary, foreign policy practice, frequently based on search, analogies, and intuition, is helping Russia become Russia. Dealings with the surrounding world are helping shape Russian statehood and helping Russia recognize its interests. Categorical assertions to the effect that Russia is required to renounce messianism immediately have been heard increasingly often of late. If what is meant by this is a renunciation of the global mentorship of the communist rulers who stinted on neither the money nor the lives of others for the sake of the universal establishment of the totalitarian utopia, there is no reason to argue with this proposition. But what if we should rush to the other extreme, going so far in our denial of messianism as to jettison the similar sounding, but not identical, concept of mission? A policy that is built on interests alone is highly vulnerable, and in Russia, in my view, it would be simply disastrous. Aside from interests, a mission--no degenerating into messianism, of course--is needed. It is said that pragmatism should be the leading principle, virtually, of our foreign policy. This assertion is in need of particular reservations and limitations. Pragmatism not balanced by healthy idealism would with us, alas, most likely degenerate into extremes and cynicism. Russia's foreign policy must provide for goals and tasks elevated above opportunistic pragmatism. Russia's mission in the world, from my viewpoint, is to initiate and support a multilateral dialogue of cultures, civilizations, and states. Russia the conciliator, Russia connecting, Russia combining. A charitable state, tolerant and open within the limits drawn by law and good will, but formidable beyond these limits. A country imbibing West and East, North and South, unique and exclusively capable, perhaps of the harmonious combination of many different principles, of a historic symphony. Such is my vision of Russia in a renewed world. This is a perfectly natural role for it, since Russia is, in itself, by nature, dualistic. It has always bifurcated and acted as an opponent to itself in order subsequently, negotiating a chain of ordeals, to reach an accord with itself. It is pointless to complain about the nature of this historical destiny. It is very important for everyone who ventures to speak on Russia's behalf to listen closely to the voice of its essence. Frankly, I would greatly regret it if some Russian version of the strictly rational school of foreign policy were to monopolize Russia's foreign policy. At the same time, were a foreign policy school to emerge combining rationalism and the pragmatic principle on the one hand and, on the other, our innate idealism and sense of Russian mission, I would be prepared to associate myself with such a school immediately. I am not talking about some speculative notions or emotional preferences. Russia should seriously reconsider its role in the United Nations and use its seat on the Security Council for the realization of its mission, for acquisition of a new status. It would make sense, evidently, having appreciably reduced the quantitative presence of Russia's representatives in the UN structure, to pay considerable attention to the qualitative aspect and to laying claim to specific offices which would help Russia realize precisely its inherent mission. The European organizations of the United Nations, and also the strengthening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) mechanism, merit special attention. Russia's new role in these structures would help it not only establish itself as a leading European power but also compensate for its present geographical distance from the center of European international life. As I see it, two lines, which may conditionally be designated Atlanticism and Eurasianism, have emerged in our foreign policy practice of late. Atlanticism gravitates toward the following set of ideas and symbols: to become European, to become a part of the world economy in rapid and organized fashion, to become the eighth member of "the Seven," and to put particular emphasis on Germany and the United States as two dominant members of the Atlantic Alliance. This is rational, pragmatic, and natural. There is credit, aid, and advanced technology there. Its opposite trend--Eurasianism--is not as yet as clearly expressed as Atlanticism, but it is already knocking on the door of the tall building in Smolenskaya (Moscow's Foggy Bottom or Quai d'Orsay). At the close of the twentieth century, attempting to resuscitate the idea of Russia's reorientation toward the East and to counteract Russia's Europeanization in its extreme forms would obviously be just as pointless and unproductive as hastily pulling the Atlantic dinner jacket and bow tie onto Russia's broad shoulders. It is obvious that it is necessary to seek a new balance of Western and Eastern orientations characteristic of the present Russia and our times. Initially, in fact, it will most likely be necessary to pay special attention to a strengthening of our positions in the East, straightening the manifest distortion permitted by the creators of the "common European home" concept. There is no way that the present Russia can escape a combination of old and new realities. The fact is that we are now separated from Europe by a whole chain of independent states. We have become further removed from it geographically and geopolitically, which will inevitably entail quite appreciable redistribution of our resources, our opinions, our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, of the eastern direction. In addition, the development of the domestic political situation, which will inevitably be reflected in foreign policy, is pushing us in this direction also. There will be a most difficult search for accord, mutual understanding, and cooperation with the Turkic and Muslim components, which have performed a tremendous role in the history of Russia. Our state emerged and grew strong as a unique historical and cultural amalgam of Slav and Turkic, Orthodox and Muslim components. Relations between them currently are on the brink of a fateful conflict. Avoiding this conflict and finding harmony here, a synthesis that will allow Russia once again to feel itself the combining, connecting conciliator, is of categorical importance. The shaping on and around the territory of the collapsed Union of an appreciable different configuration of strategic interests is confronting Russia with a new historical challenge. We are seeing how the influence of the Muslim world, both geographically close to us and further removed, on our domestic political situation is growing, how zones of influence in the territories of contiguous Asian republics and in the territory of Russia are gradually emerging, and how an arc of crisis (to use the well-known image of the 1970s) from the Transcaucasus through North Caucasus toward the Volga region is progressively taking shape. Ignoring all this is impossible. Not to understand which dominant powers of the Near and MIddle East (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia)